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support.  I acknowledge  my debt to the fellows  of The  Levy Institute  (in particular  to Marc Jarsulic 
and Anwar  Shaikh)  and to Bill Gaynor  of Bard College for their helpful  suggestions.  I am grateful 
to Jean  French  who made my English much  more readable. More  than  fifty  years  after  the  publication  of  Keynes'  General 
Theorv  and  of  the  review  article  by  Hicks,  ISLM  remains  the  basic 
model  for  teaching  Keynesian  macroeconomics.  Some  Keynesians  'have 
rightly  insisted  on  the  inadequacies  of  ISLM  in  capturing  Keynes' 
thought  but  have  not  converted  the  profession  to  their  views.  The 
same  fate  may  befall  this  paper  whose  aim  is  to  suggest  an 
alternative  class-room  model  in  the  Keynesian  and  Kaleckian 
tradition.  Nevertheless,  in  accordance  with  Orange's  lucid 
motto,ttil  n'est  pas  necessaire  d'esperer  pour  entreprendre  ni  de 
reussir  pour  perseverertt... 
The  main  thesis  is  that  the  concept  of  static  equilibrium, 
central  to  ISLM,  is  not  adequate  to  express  the  most  fundamental 
aspect  of  the  Keynesian  revolution.  The  first  section  of  the 
paper  is  devoted  to  a  defense  of  the  more  general  concept  of 
viability.  Static  equilibrium  will  appear  as  but  one  particular 
example  of  this  larger  notion. 
A  very  simple  model  is  presented  in  the  second  section.  Its 
distinctive  feature,  aside  from  its  inclusion  of  the  ISLM 
equations,  is  to  make  a clear  distinction  between  the  macroeconomic 
relations  exhibiting  the  consequences  of  the  decisions  of  the 
aqents  on  the  one  hand  and  the  principles  according  to  which  these 
decisions  are  taken  and  carried  out  on  the  other.  The  concept  of 
static  equilibrium,by  contrast,  is  founded  on  the  confusion  of  the 
two:  a  necessary  condition  for  individual  actions  to  be  effective 
is  their  mutual  compatibility. 3 
The  third  section  deals  very  briefly  with  the  implications  of 
the  model  for  the  analysis  of  macroeconomic  policy. 
I 
VIABILITY  VERSUS  EQUILIBRIUM  ? 
Static  equilibrium  refers  to  a  situation  of  mutual 
compatibility  of  individual  economic  actions.  The  solution  of  the 
system  of  equations  determines  the  prices  and  quantities\so  that 
the  desired  actions  of  a  agents  can  be  simultaneously  realized. 
Within  this  framework,  it  is  impossible  to  think  of  economic  mag- 
nitudes  being  effective  outside  equilibrium  (not being  the  solution 
of  the  system  of  equations).  An  instantaneous  mechanism  of 
adjustment  is  thus  supposed  to  drive  the  economy  towards  the  point 
of  rest  (if  unique).  The  infinite  velocity  of  this  adjustment  is 
a necessary  hypothesis  if  one  does  not  wish  to  elucidate  the  dynam- 
ic  process  and  deal  with  transitory  situations. 
The  clear  awareness  of  the  self-contradictory  character  of 
speaking  of  effective  non-equilibrium  magnitudes  is  the  positive 
outcome  of  the  rational  expectations  school  and  of  its  critics  of 
traditional  dynamic  modelling.  It  is  equally  a  justification  ex 
post  facto  of  the  growing  variety  of  equilibria  (temporary,  K, 
Nash-,  conjectural  equilibria  etc.)  economic  theory  creates  in 
order  to  keep  up  with  new  problems. 
Keynesians  (or  Kaleckians)  refuse  the  methodology  of  static 
equilibrium  and  its  implications.  Two  good  general  reasons  may  be 
invoked  for  that  rebuttal.  The  first  is  that  the  economy  is 
monetary  in  essence.  The  second  is  the  asymmetry  of  the  relations 
between  entrepreneurs  and  other  people  (wage-earners  typically). 
That  economy  be  monetary  in  essence  does  not  essentially  mean 
there  exists  a  link  between  present  and  future  (as  so  often 
Keynesians  maintain)'.  More  decisive  is  that  each  agent  has  at  his 
disposal  a  means  of  making  effective  his  planned  actions  more  or 4 
less  independently  of  their  compatibility  with  those  of  all  others. 
BY  contrast,  the  traditional  view  of  the  feasibility  of 
transactions  requires,  as  in  the  Walrasian  tatonnement,  a  general 
coordination  of  u  agents.  The  mere  existence  of  money  reveals 
that  a  different  coordination  prevails  in  the  economy. 
In  that  sense,  money  and  equilibrium  can  be  viewed  as  two 
substitutable  notions  each  expressing  a particular  organization  of 
economic  relations.  Being  accepted  by  all  agents,  money  is 
equivalent  to  the  consent  of  the  economy  as  a  whole  to  the  action 
of  its  possessor.  It  allows  him,  to  a  certain  extent,  to  transform 
a  private  and  subjective  project  into  a  social  and  objective 
action. 
On  a very  different  plane,  the  asymmetry  between  entrepreneurs 
and  the  other  agents  leads  one  to  discard  the  tool  of  static 
equilibrium  as  well. 
According  to  Keynes  and  Kalecki,  only  entrepreneurs  have  the 
capacity  to  determine  the  level  of  the  economic  activity  through 
their  expenditures.  Other  agents  can  react  but  they  cannot  make 
this  level  change  for  the  period  under  consideration.  The  economic 
hierarchy  (we  shall  see  that  it  is  founded  on  monetary 
considerations)  is  formally  expressed  by  the  recursivitv  of  the 
model.  For  every  given  period  entrepreneurs'  decisions  influence 
non-entrepreneurs  and  the  reverse  is  not  true.  General 
interdependence  and  mutual  compatibility  and  thus  static 
equilibrium  cease  to  be  relevant  in  this  context. 
However,  individual  decisions  are  still  voluntary  ones. 
Economic  agents  act  freely  under  general  constraints  and  aim  to 
maximize  their  advantage  (profit  or  welfare).  The  point  raised  in 
this  paper  does  not  concern  so  much  the  rationality  of  the 
behaviour  of  entrepreneurs  or  wage-earners  but  the  way  their 
actions  are  coordinated. 
Let  us  see  more  precisely  what  is  meant  by  that  in  a  very 
simple  macroeconomic  framework. 5 
<a>  Entrepreneurs  come  first.  They  fix  the  amount  of  their 
desired  level  of  activity  on  the  basis  of  their  expectations  or, 
what  amounts  to  the  same,  they  determine  a  desired  level  of 
expenditures. 
Two  sorts  of  expenditures  have  to  be distinguished.  The  first 
ones  are  directed  towards  other  entrepreneurs  (Keynes  calls  them 
investment  in  Chapter  6  of  General  Theory)  and  the  second  towards 
non-entrepreneurs  (factor  cost  according  to  Keynes).  For  the  sake 
of  simplicity  we  shall  suppose  that  these  factor  costs  are  the  sole 
costs  incurred  by  entrepreneurs.  Thus  the  expenditures.between 
entrepreneurs  represent  the  expenditure  of  expected  profits. 
But  deciding  a given  amount  of  planned  expenditures  (according 
to  the  effective  demand  principle)  is  not  sufficient  to  make  them 
effective.  Two  additional  conditions  have  to  be  fulfilled. 
The  first  one  has  been  recently  intensively  studied  under  the 
heading  of  finance  motive.  Entrepreneurs  have  to  raise  funds  in 
order  to  execute  their  plans.  Here  enters  the  banking  and 
financial  system.  In  accepting  or  refusing  to  finance  the  projects 
of  the  entrepreneurs,  the  banking  system  acts  as  a  coordinator 
which  selects  according  to  different  criteria  (prudential  ratios 
or  agreement  on  the  state  of  expectations)  the  socially  acceptable 
commitments  of  the  entrepreneurs. 
The  second  condition,  far  more  neglected,  is  that  people  to 
whom  expenditures  are  directed  accept  the  operation.  Though  a 
general  compatibility  is  not  required,  obviously  no  economictrans- 
action  can  take  place  without  the  aqreement  of  people  who  are 
party  to  it  (unless  we  are  able  to  explain  why  this  condition  is 
not  necessary  as  will  be  the  case  for  the  workers). 
Concerning  expenditures  between  entrepreneurs,  Keynes  himself 
proposes  a  solution  when  he  makes  the  hypothesis  that  entrepreneurs 
in  the  equipment  goods  sector  work  on  order.  In  a  sense  this 
VVsolutionl'is  not  satisfactory  since  the  traditional  problem  of 
mutual  compatibility  (restricted  to  the  equipment  sector  goods) 
seems  to  be  left  unsolved.  However,  the  mode  of  coordination  due 6 
to  the  presence  of  money  modifies  the  terms  of  the  problem. 
As  a  consequence  of  the  monetary  character  of  the  economy, 
entrepreneurs  have  to  execute  their  plans  without  knowing  their 
immediate  consequences.  That  means,  in  contrast  with  an  economy 
driven  by  the  auctioneer,  that  a considerable  amount  of  information 
is  not  available.  Carrying  out  their  decisions,  entrepreneurs  are 
looking  for  information.  The  relevant  information  is  determined 
by  their  first  intentions.  With  an  auctioneer  each  entrepreneur 
knows  all  the  prices.  In  a  monetary  economy  each  entrepreneur 
looks  for  the  prices  of  the  sole  commodities  in  which  he  is 
interested.  The  entrepreneur  acquires  certain  information'on  the 
conditions  of  realization  of  project  A  because  he  plans  to  realize 
this  project  A.  Some  information  relating  to  another  project  (B) 
could,  if  available,  make  him  switch  to  B.  But  the  information 
will  never  come  to  him  because  he  does  not  have  the  opportunity  to 
try  to  carry  out  project  B. 
Moreover,  the  investment  decisions  of  the  entrepreneurs  (in 
fact  the  expenditure  of  current  expected  profits)  are  made,  not  on 
the  basis  of  the  current  profitability,  but  on  that  of  the  prospect 
of  future  profits.  "We  must  not  forget  that,  in  the  case  of 
durable  goods,  the  producer's  short-term  expectations  are  based  on 
the  current  long-term  expectations  of  the  investor;  and  it  is  of 
the  nature  of  long-term  expectations  that  they  cannot  be  checked 
at  short  intervals  in  the  light  of  realised  results"  (Keynes 
General  Theory  p.  51).  In  other  terms,  the  investment  is  not 
related  to  other  decisions  for  the  current  period  (nor  are  the 
receipts  of  the  entrepreneurs  in  the  equipment  sector). 
To  sum  up,  the  coordination  relating  to  the  investment 
expenditures,  which  gives  sense  to  Keynes'  hypothesis,  is  quite 
different  from  that  attached  to  the  notion  of  equilibrium  and 
reminds  us  that  the  market  does  not  exist  but  as  a  consequence  of 
the  impossibility  of  coordinating  a  priori  the  actions  of  the 
individuals. 7 
Concerning  the  factor  costs  expenditures,  the  argument  is 
quite  different.  We  shall  limit  ourselves  to  the  case  of  wages 
(interest  payments  are  the  consequence  of  prior  commitments  and  do 
not  raise  any  problems  of  mutual  acceptance)  which  are  the  main 
factor  cost  (the  sole  considered  in  the  model  below). 
It  must  be  emphasized  that  nominal  wage  is  not  determined  on  a 
market  in  the  ordinary  sense  of  the  term.  The  collective 
bargaining  between  entrepreneurs  and  wage-earners  may  bring  about 
a  wage-scale,  a  wage  level  or  some  kind  of  price-indexation  but 
never  a  determined  level  of  employment!  18Price'V  is  determined  not 
ttquantityV8.  Trying  to  save  the  idea  of  a  labor  market  by  'saying 
that  labor  supply  is  infinitely  inelastic  in  relation  to  nominal 
wage  is  not  the  best  way  to  take  into  account  the  fundamental 
asymmetry  between  entrepreneurs  and  wage-earners. 
We  must  recall  here  our  central  theme,  namely  the  executa- 
bility  of  economic  plans  or  decisions.  The  possession  of  money  or 
the  access  to  credit  is  the  general  prerequisite  for  being  able  to 
undertake  economic  actions.  Now  wage-earners  are  such  precisely 
because  they  are  not  able  to  work  on  their  own  account  and  to  be 
autonomous  agents  carrying  out  their  own  plans.  They  cannot 
benefit  from  credit  creation*.  They  need  money  and  the  only  way 
of  getting  it  is  to  be  waged. 
The  payment  of  the  wages  in  this  sense  does  not  require  a 
mutual  acceptance  since  people  are  not  on  the  same  footing.  In 
order  to  capture  this  idea  the  term  of  ranport  salarial  has  been 
coined  and  elucidated  in  different  ways3. 
Thus,  a  central  feature  of  the  economy  is  the  working  of  a 
banking  system.  Whether  people  have,  or  have  not,  access  to  money 
created  by  credit  they  are,  or  are  not,  affected  by  the  effective 
demand  principle.  The  banking  system  plays  part  of  the  role  of  the 
Walrasian  auctioneer,  allowing  the  entrepreneurs  to  make  their 
decisions  effective.  However,  in  sharp  contrast  with  the  Walrasian 
system,  this  coordination  is  independent  from  the  general  mutual 
compatibility  of  actions  and  from  the  existence  of  equilibrium. a 
<b>  Now  come  the  wage-earners.  Once  wage  and  employment  have 
been  determined  they  are  free  to  use  the  money  as  they  wi114. 
According  to  the  traditional  maximization  of  a  utility  function 
under  the  budgetary  constraint  of  the  wage  or  according  to  whatever 
other  principle,  they  fix  their  consumption  and  their  saving,  the 
latter  taking  the  form  of  the  variation  of  the  amount  of  bonds 
(supposed  to  be  perpetuities)  owned  or  of  the  variation  of  their 
current  account  at  the  banks. 
Here  too  we  have  to  inquire  into  the  conditions  of  execution 
of  these  plans.  . 
Obviously,  there  is  no  problem  for  the  bank  deposits  since 
workers  perceive  their  revenue  under  this  form.  It  is  always 
possible,  in  principle,  to  accumulate  all  the  wage  in  deposits. 
For  consumption  things  run  differently.  Even  if 
entrepreneurs  are  price-setters  and  workers  price-takers,  it  may 
happen  that  some  desired  transactions  are  actually  impossible, 
supply  being  short.  More  generally,  we  have  to  make  clear  whether 
some  adjustments  on  the  market  may  or  may  not  take  place.  These 
adjustments  consist  of  prices  or  inventories  variations.  In  the 
model  below  these  difficulties  will  be  overlooked  in  order  not  to 
obscure  the  main  point:  in  any  case,  whatever  these  secondary 
adjustments  may  be,  they  do  not  modify  the  current  level  of 
employment  nor  the  amount  of  investment.  Here  again  we  find  the 
recursivity  of  the  system. 
For  the  sake  of  simplicity  we  shall  suppose  that  entrepreneurs 
issue  perpetuities  "on  tap".  The  idea  is  that  long  term 
indebtedness  is  always  preferable  to  short  term  indebtedness  to 
banks.  Workers  can  thus  always  realize  their  desired  transactions 
in  bonds. 
CC>  It  must  now  be  emphasized  that  the  realization  of  desired 
actions  more  or  less  independently  of  their  mutual  compatibility 
has  a counterpart:  the  final  outcome  mav  be  hishlv  undesirable  and, 
at  least,  involuntary.  This  is,  of  course,  a  marked  contrast  to 
equilibrium. 9 
In  a monetary  economy  the  form  taken  by  this  is  very  clear  and 
precise:  some  of  the  entrepreneurs  (or  all)  experience  a  deficit. 
Others  may  realize  positive  balances.  Some  cannot  repay  to  the 
banking  system  the  money  they  had  raised  for  financing  their 
expenditures.  They  may  incur  bankruptcy.  The  theoretical  problems 
raised  by  the  settlement  of  the  balances  are  too  complex  to  be 
discussed  here5.  We  shall  suppose  instead  that,  within  certain 
limits,  it  is  always  possible  to  make  the  excess  agents  finance, 
directly  or  indirectly,  the  deficit  agents.  Whenever  such  a 
spontaneous  finance  cannot  take  place  a  lender  of  last  resort  has 
the  option  to  solve  or  not  to  solve  the  problem.  In  the‘latter 
case  it  is  possible  to  speak  of  a  major  crisis,  in  that  some 
fundamental  rules  of  the  game  have  to  be  changed  (think  of  the  Gold 
Standard  for  instance  or  of  the  entire  structure  of  the  financial 
system).  In  the  former  case,  that  of  spontaneous  finance,  the 
system  may  be  in  a  state  of  viability,  which  means  that  the  current 
rules  of  the  game  are  not  put  into  danger'. 
We  have  seen  that  the  banking  and  financial  system  plays  a 
central  role  at  the  two  ends  of  the  economic  process.  First  it 
allows  entrepreneurs  to  make  their  projects  effective  (or  not  if 
they  are  too  far  from  prevalent  conventions).  Second  it  more  or 
less  guarantees  that  the  unforeseen  consequences  of  these  actions 
are  not  too  damageable  for  the  economy  as  a whole.  But  this  is  less 
the  effect  of  Providence  or  of  a clear-cut  perception  of  the  system 
by  the  monetary  authority  than  the  involuntary  consequence  of  the 
adoption  of  certain  rules  or  conventions.  BY  viabilitv  we  mean 
here  the  set  of  all  the  possible  situations  of  the  economy  which 
do  not  violate  these  rules. 
Each  element  of  this  set  is  potentially  observable  and 
measurable  since  its  realization  is  possible.  Equilibrium  is  then 
no  more  the  condition  of  the  effectiveness  of  an  economic 
situation.  In  a  monetary  economy  the  coordination  works  in  such 
a  way  that  equilibrium  is  only  a  particular  case  among  all  the 
viable  positions,  where  all  the  entrepreneurs'  balances  are  spon- 10 
taneously  equal  to  zero. 
cd>  The  preceding  developments  enable  us  to  do  the  following: 
(i)  To  elaborate  effective  dynamic  processes  which  are 
not  simple  virtual  paths  towards  static  equilibrium  (see  the 
Walrasian  tatonnement).  All  the  points  of  these  effective  paths 
will  be  observable  situations  (if  included  in  the  viability  set) 
interesting  for  their  own  sake:  if  stable,  these  paths  will  lead 
the  economy  towards  an  equilibrium.  Equilibrium  is  then  defined 
in  a  dynamic  sense  as  the  limit  point  of  an  orbit.  It  may  or  may 
not  coincide  with  the  static  one  according  to  the  shape>of  the 
dynamic  system  (path  effects  are  the  rule  in  non  linear  models). 
(ii)  To  examine  anew  the  problem  of  the  relation  between 
investment  and  saving. 
Two  points  are  well-known:  the  equality  between  saving  and 
investment  is  an  equilibrium  condition  for  both  orthodox  theory  and 
ISLE  model,  whereas  for  Keynes  and  Kalecki  saving  and  investment 
are  two  different  names  for  the  same  thing.  From  this  one  may 
conclude  either  that  Keynes  and  Kalecki  are  wrong  or  that  ISL&I  is 
not  a  correct  expression  of  their  ideas.  Mainstream  economists 
maintain  that  both  hold.  They  have  accredited  the  opinion  that 
ISLM  was  a  correct  formulation  because  Keynes'  theory  was  not 
correct  in  its  original  terms  . 
In  the  framework  sketched  above,  it  is  perfectly  clear  that 
investment  and  saving  are  "merely  different  aspects  of  the  same 
thing"  (Keynes  General  Theory  p.74)  even  in  effective  situations 
out  of  equilibrium  (that  is  to  say  viable). 
If  p1  and  wN  are,  respectively,  the  investment  and  the  factor 
cost,  pC  the  consumption  expenditures,  saving,  defined  as  the 
excess  of  income  over  consumption  is  another  name  for  investment. 
Profits  are  equal  to  the  excess  of  receipts  (pI+pC)  over  the  costs 
(wN)  and  are  the  saving  of  the  entrepreneurs  (by  definition  they 
do  not  consume).  If  we  add  to  this  saving  that  of  wage-earners 
(equal  to  wN-pC)  we  find  the  investment. 11 
This  identity  is  impossible  to  fit  into  a  theory  dominated 
by  the  notion  of  equilibrium.  There  is  a  natural  room  for  it  as 
soon  as  the  concept  of  viability  has  been  substituted  for 
equilibrium.  But  this  implies  not  only  a  change  in  words  but  a 
change  in  theory,  namely  the  elucidation  of  the  coordination  of 
individual  actions  in  a  monetary  economy  with  a  raooort  salarial. 
II 
THE  MODEL  \ 
\ 
Let  us  assume  an  oversimplified  one-good  economy  with two 
groups  of  agents,  entrepreneurs  and  workers,  and  a  banking  and 
financial  system.  The  latter  is  reduced  to  a  lender  of  last  resort 
which  fixes  exogeneously  the  rate  of  interest  and  provides 
entrepreneurs  with  the  quantity  of  the  means  of  payment  they  need 
through  credit  creation.  Entrepreneurs  have  to  repay  the  credit 
at  the  end  of  the  period. 
Entrepreneurs  determine  their  investment  expenditures  for  the 
period  according  to  the  familiar  equation: 
(1)  p1  =  LT  -  er 
where  LT  is  the  state  of  long  term  expectations  exogeneously  given 
and  r  the  rate  of  the  interest  depending  on  the  banking  system. 
They  settle  their  current  level  of  activity  wN  on  the  basis 
of  their  short  term  expectations.  As  we  know  part  of  these  are  the 
consequence  of  (1)  since  entrepreneurs  of  the  equipment  sector7 
work  on  order.  Other  elements  are  the  anticipation  of  the  extent 
of  the  market  for  consumption  and  the  general  conditions  made  by 
the  Bank.  The  value  of  the  expected  proceeds  R  being  fixed,  the 
amount  of  wages  is  deduced  through  the  predetermined  mark  up  m: 
(2)  wN  =  R/m 
As  a  matter  of  fact,  it  is  possible  to  show  that  m  is 
determined  by  microeconomic  considerations  as  shown  in  the 
appendix. 12 
If  p1  and  wN  are  such  that  the  banking  system  provides  funds 
for  their  realization,  entrepreneurs  can  execute  their  plans 
independently  of  their  conseauences  upon  other  people.  It  is  then 
possible  to  study  the  macroeconomic  relations  showing  the  effects 
of  these  decisions  (on  the  entrepreneurs  themselves  through  the 
reactions  of  workers)  without  making  any  implication  regarding  the 
effective  levels  of  investment  and  employment.  Clearly  this  would 
be  nonsense  in  a  model  like  ISIJ4  where  the  sole  effective 
quantities  are  equilibrium  ones. 
The  reactions  of  wage-earners  are  given  by  the  consumption 
function  and  that  of  hoarding.  The  former  is  very  simple  indeed: 
(3)  pC  =  b  wN 
If  we  introduce  a  public  sector,  we  have  to  add  the  public 
expenditure  (exogeneously  determined): 
(3a)  pC  =  b  wN  +  pG 
The  saving  of  workers  takes  the  form  of  a  variation  in  their 
deposit  accounts  M  or  in  their  bonds  portfolio  T.  The  former  is 
given  by: 
(4)  M  =  f  wN  -  g  r 
the  latter  by  difference  (T=wN-PC-M): 
(4a)  T  =  (l-b-f)  wN  +  g  r 
Taking  into  account  the  way  wage-earners  react  to 
entrepreneurs'  decisions,  it  is  possible  to  show  some  fundamental 
macroeconomic  relations. 
The  effective  profit  of  the  entrepreneurs  is  the  excess  of 
receipts  over  the  costs: 
(5)  P  =  pC  +  p1  +  pG  -  wN 
or: 
(5a)  P  =  p1  +  pG  -  (l-b)  wN 
Equation  (5a)  is  the  simplest  expression  of  Kalecki's  principle. 
Entrepreneurs  as  a  whole  earn  what  they  spend  because  they 
determine,  to  a  certain  point,  the  level  of  their  "budgetary 
constrainttl.  There  is  in  fact  no  constraint  at  all:  by  pushing  up 
the  amount  of  their  investment  expenditure,  they  increase  at  the 13 
same  time  the  amount  of  their  receipts.  If  it  were  not  possible 
for  them  to  fix  the  level  of  their  expenditures  (which  in  turn 
implies  a  determinate  relation  to  the  banking  system)  there  would 
be  no  room  for  Kalecki's  principle. 
The  effective  profit  may  differ  from  the  expected  one,  which 
is  equal,  by  definition,  to: 
(6)  Pe  =  (m-l)  wN 
The  equality  between  expected  and  realized  profit  is  obtained 
for: 
(R)  wN  =  (pI+pG)/(m-b)  . 
It  is  easy  to  verify  that  the  condition  (R)  is  equivalent  to 
the  IS  curve  of  the  ISLE  model.  It  is  the  consequence  of  the 
equality  R  =  pQ  =  pC  +  p1  +  pG.  Using  (1)  for  expressing  p1  in 
function  of  r  we  get  from  (R): 
(IS)  wN  =  (LT  +  pG)/(m-b)  -  (e/m-b)  r 
On  the  other  hand,  the  difference  between  total  receipts  and  total 
expenditures  gives  the  amount  of  additional  indebtedness  D  that 
entrepreneurs  must  accept': 
(7)  D  =  p1  +  wN  -  p1  -  pC  -  pG 
The  deficit  is  equal  to  workers'  saving  minus  public  deficit. 
If  we  suppose  that  entrepreneurs  do  not  wish  to  be  indebted  to  the 
banking  system,  the  condition  of  not  incurring  insolvency  is  that 
the  deficit  be  totally  financed  through  the  perpetuities  issues. 
Assuming  public  deficit  pG  is  always  financed  by  bonds,  it  is  easy 
to  check  that  the  condition  of  solvency  of  the  entrepreneurs  is 
given  by  the  constancy  of  the  deposits  of  the  workers,  that  is: 
(W  wN  =  (g/f)r 
Using  (l),  this  condition  may  be  expressed  as  a  relation 
between  wN  and  p1: 
(S)  wN  =  (gLT/ef)  -  (g/ef)  p1 
One  is  tempted  to  solve  the  system  ISLM  or  the  system  RS. 
Doing  so,  one  finds  the  set  of  values  for  r,  wN  and  p1  which  are 
compatible  with  the  simultaneous  fulfillment  of  the  two  conditions, 
relating  respectively  to  the  rentability  (R)  and  to  the  solvency 14 
(S)  -  These  values  are: 
r+  =  [f(LT+pG)]/[g(m-b)+ef] 
(8)  wN+=  [g(LT+pG)J/[g(m-b)+ef] 
PI+=  [g(m-b)LT-efpG]/[g(m-b)+ef] 
In  the  traditional  methodology  of  static  equilibrium  the 
meaning  of  (8)  is  very  clear:  they  are  the  sole  values  which  could 
be  effective  because  they  define  the  equilibrium  situation.  Here 
the  story  is  not  the  same.  The  relations  (R)  and  (S)  [or  (IS)  and 
(LM)]  tell  us  nothing  about  the  effective  values  of  p1  and  wN  which 
depend  only  on  LT,  r  and  R  (and  not  on  f,  g  or  b).  The  interest 
of  (R)  and  (S)  is  they  allow  us  to  characterize  the  effective 
situation  of  the  economy  given  from  outside  the  system  ISLE  [or 
RS]. 
Putting  aside  for  the  moment  the  question  of  the  limits  due 
to  the  banking  system,  an  effective  situation  is  any  point  [wN>O, 
pI>O]  of  the  schema  la  (or  any  point  [wN>O,  r>O]  of  schema  lb). 
If  such  a  point  lies  to  the  right  (to  the  left)  of  (R) r 
entrepreneurs  would  experience  a  rentability  inferior  (superior) 
to  what  they  expected.  Conversely  if  the  point  is  situated  to  the 
right  (left)  of  (S),  entrepreneurs  would  be,  from  the  point  of  view 
of  solvency,  in  a  worse  (better)  situation. 
The  plane  is  thus  divided  into  four  regions  dependent  upon 
the  signs  of  the  unexpected  differences  in  rentability  and 
solvency.  These  differences  have  no  effect  during  the  period  on 
the  value  of  p1  and  wN.  It  is,  however,  quite  natural  to  think 
that  they  have  an  influence  on  the  decisions  of  entrepreneurs  in 
future  periods.  It  is  on  such  basic  considerations  that  a  very 
simple  dynamic  model  may  be  built. 
In  regions  1  and  3  rentability  and  solvency  considerations 
are  acting  in  the  same  direction:  the  change  of  the  current 
activity  will  be  unambiguously  positive  (region  1)  or  negative 
(region  3).  In  regions  2  and  4  the  two  influences  are  of  opposing 
signs  and  the  outcome  will  depend  on  the  relative  strength  of  the 
influence  of  rentability  and  solvency:  the  current  activity  may ch  .ange  positively  or  negatively  according  to  the  weight  of  the  two 
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influences. 
In  order  to  formalize  very  simply  this  idea,  we  shall  assume 
that  the  change  in  the  state  of  short  term  expectations  of  the 
entrepreneurs  depends  on  the  observations  of  unexpected  results  in 
the  following  way: 
(9)  dR/dt  =  k,(P-Pe)  -  k,B 
where  B  is  the  variation  of  the  indebtedness  with  the  banking 
system,  equal  to  M. 
The  form  adopted  in  (9)  is  very  simple.  It  guarantees+owever 
that,  even  if  P =  Pe,  the  financial  position  of  entrepreneurs  piays 
a  role  in  the  motion  of  the  economy  over  time  (this  would  not  be 
the  case  if  the  two  factors  were  combined  in  a  multiplicative 
manner)'. 
Since  dwN/dt  =  (l/m)  dR/dt  we  get,  substituting  P,  Pe  and  B 
for  their  values  in  (5a),  (6)  and  (4): 
(10)  dwN/dt  =  (k,/m)pI-(l/m)  [k, (m-W+k,flwN 
+ (l/m)  (k,pG+k,gr) 
The  general  solution  of  (10)  is: 
(*)  wN(,,  =  wN*  +  wN,,,  e 
-(l/m)[kl(m-b)+k2flt 
where  wN*  is  the  stationary  solution  of  (10)  and  wN,,,  an  initial 
condition.  wN*  will  indicate  the  limit  point  of  (lo),  if  stable. 
It  will  be  an  equilibrium  situation  in  the  dynamic  sense.  The 
stationary  solution  is: 
(11)  wN*  =  [k,(pI+pG)+k,gr]/[k,(m-b)+k2f] 
It  is  easy  to  check  that  the  path  generated  by  (*)  is  stable: 
when  t  tends  to  infinity,  wN(t)  tends  to  wN*. 
It  is  worth  noticing  that  wN*  will  differ  in  general  from  the 
wN+  solution  of  the  ISLE  model.  The  economy  will  not  tend  towards 
the  static  equilibrium  E  but  towards  one  of  the  noints  of  the  line 
ST  which  depends  on  the  value  of  the  exoqeneous  rate  of  interest. 
The  shape  of  ST  is  positive  if  we  suppose  that  the  rentability 
motive  acts  stronger  than  the  solvency  motive,  as  is  done  in  schema 
1.  wN*  is  a  weighted  average  of  wN  given  by  (R)  and  wN  given  by 16 
(S)  -  For  example,  if  the  lender  of  last  resort  pegs  the  rate  of 
interest  at  r+,  wN*  will  coincide  with  wN+". 
This  very  simple  proposition  is  obviously  dependent  upon  the 
ability  of  the  banking  system  to  alleviate  the  unexpected  outcomes 
of  the  voluntary  decisions  of  agents.  It  is  not  unreasonable  to 
think  there  are  some  limits  to  the  willingness  of  the  bank  to  allow 
entrepreneurs  to  execute  all  their  decisions  (with  the  risk  of 
experiencing  bankruptcy).  More  generally,  the  rules  of  the  game 
are  such  that  all  the  points  of  the  plane  (wn,pI)  are  not  possible. 
For  the  sake  of  illustration  we  shall  take  very  simple  and  crude 
rules  specifying  maximum  levels  for  tolerable  differences  'either 
in  rentability  (MR)  or  in  solvency  (MS).  These  limits  are 
represented  on  the  schema  by  the  straight  lines  MR  and  MS 
respectively. 
The  model  is  now  completed  with  the  delimitation  of  a 
viability  set  V  which  contains  all  the  allowed  effective 
situations.  These  can  be  classified  in  three  classes: 
(a)  the  static  equilibrium  E  (the  ISLE  solution) 
(b)  the  points  of  ST  (being  in  V)  which  are  dynamic 
equilibria  reflecting  the  existence  of  a  special  mode  of 
coordination  between  agents 
(c)  the  points  of  V  which  are  effective  outside 
equilibrium  situations  (this  sounds  self-contradictory 
in  static  equilibrium  methodology). 
Properties  of  the  dynamic  equilibria  (ST)  are  obviously  those 
acknowledged  by  Keynes  and  Keynesian  "Fundamentalistsl'.  Two  of 
them  are  to  be  emphasized. 
The  equilibrium  is  restricted  to  entrepreneurs  (effective 
demand  principle)  so  that  nothing  is  implied  for  the  workers 
(except  that  N  =<  E  where  E  is  the  amount  of  labour).  The 
asymmetry  between  workers  and  entrepreneurs  has  as  a  consequence 
the  incapacity  of  the  workers  to  effect  a change  in  such  situations 
(through  purely  economic  actions).  If  the  level  of  activity  wN* 
is  such  that,  at  the  current  level  of  wage  w,  more  than  N*  workers 17 
are  willing  to  be  waged  there  will  be  involuntarv  unemplovment. 
Nothing  can  cure  that  unemployment  (the  price  is  endogeneous  as 
shown  in  the  appendix)  except  a  public  policy  (either  by  changing 
the  rate  of  interest  or  by  augmenting  pG). 
There  is  no  monetarv  neutrality  in  the  economy.  A  change  in 
the  rate  of  interest  (the  only  monetary  exogeneous  variable)  alters 
the  current  level  of  economic  activity  and  the  investment  (and 
their  equilibrium  level  as  well)  as  it  is  easy  to  see  on  schema 
1  or  by  looking  at  equation  (10). 
. 
III 
A  BRIEF  LOOK  AT  ECONOMIC  POLICY 
Economic  policy  analysis  in  text-books  is  confined  to 
comparative  statics.  It  is  the  direct  consequence  of  reasoning 
along  the  static  equilibrium  approach.  The  successive  steps  of  the 
reasoning  are  well-known:  put  the  model  in  reduced  form,  take  the 
partial  derivatives  for  economic  policy  exogeneous  variables  and 
comment  on  the  values  thus  obtained.  This  leads  to  conclusions 
about  the  comparative  efficiency  of  alternative  economic  policies 
according  to  the  value  of  the  different  policy  multipiers. 
The  legitimacy  of  this  approach  is  beyond  doubt,  but  the 
validity  of  its  conclusions  depends  heavily  upon  a  proof  of  the 
stability  of  the  equilibria  compared.  This  proof  is  so  rarely 
supplied  that  one  may  think  it  is  not  even  necessary... 
In  the  framework  proposed  here  there  is  no  danger  of 
overlooking  the  point  since  the  stationary  state  wN*  cannot  be 
reckoned  independently  of  the  dynamic  system  and  of  the  intensity 
of  the  different  forces  at  work  (k, and  k2). 
It  is  beyond  the  scope  of  this  paper  to  deal  with  economic 
policy  issues.  What  follows  is  just  for  the  sake  of  methodological 
purpose.  Two  cases  will  be  examined  which  differ  according  to I
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the rule adopted by the lender of last resort.
Let us suppose first that the lender of last  resort is
concerned with the solvency of the banking system. If we admit
that the normal activity of the banks is to provide entrepreneurs
with a sufficient quantity of means of payment" and not to finance
unexpected deficits, every increase in the loans to entregreneurs
(at the end of the period) not only diminishes the solvency of the
entrepreneurs but that of the banks as well. In that case the
lender of last resort has to raise the rate of interest in order
to prevent a further  decrease,in  the solvency of the banks. This
rule is reversible and the rate of interest would be lowered if
entrepreneurs were able to be creditors of the banking system
(whenever they experience high levels of bonds subscription).
Formally:
(11)  dr/dt =  k,  B =  k,  (fwN-gr)
As dpI/dt = -e  dr/dt  [see equation  (l)],  the system which
describes the path of the economy is:
dpI/dt  =  -k,efwN  +  k,egr
(Sl)
dwN/dt =(k,/m)pI-(l/m)[k,(mb)+k2f]wN
+ (l/m)  (k,pG+k,gr)
The stationary solution of  (Sl)  is nothing but the  wN+  and  pI+
which is the same as the static equilibrium of the ISLM model.
This conclusion is quite natural since the rule followed by the
monetary authority is congruent with the satisfaction of condition
(S) l The rate of interest ceases to vary when the solvency of the
entrepreneurs is granted. As (10) is stable and under the
influence of the rentability motive, wN*  will be equal to  wN+.
Moreover, it appears that  (Sl)  is  stable12. A comparative statics
analysis would have given the same result: replacing r by r+ in the
static system formed by (R) and (S) would obviously give  wN+  and
pI+.
Incidentally, it should be noticed that no stationary solution
of  (lo),  except for r=r+, makes the long term expectations
compatible with the short term ones. It is therefore necessary19 
that  the  monetary  authority  intervene  by  adjusting  the  rate  of 
interest.  Without  this  action  the  rate  of  interest  has  no 
equilibrium  value  from  a  Keynesian  point  of  view13. 
A  second  example  can  be  studied  wherein  the  lender  of  last 
resort  attempts  now  to  drive  the  economy  towards  a  predeterminate 
financial  structure,  say  a  fixed  profits/investment  ratio  a*.  It 
will  raise  (decrease)  the  rate  of  interest  if  the  observed  P/p1  is 
below  (above)  a*.  Formally,  the  economic  policy  is: 
(12)  dr/dt  =  -  k,(P  -  a*pI) 
Accordingly,  the  dynamic  system  is  now,  (replacing  P$ by  its 
\ 
value): 
dpI/dt  =  ek,(l-a*)pI  -  ek,(l-b)wN+ek,pG 
(S2) 
dwN/dt=(k,/m)pI  -(l/m)[k,(m-b)+k,f]wN 
+(1/m)  (k,pG+k,gr) 
In  general  the  stationary  solution  of  (S2)  will  differ  from  , 
(Sl)  since  the  stationary  rate  corresponding  to  rule  (12)  is  not 
equal  to  r+  except  by  chance  for  a  particular  value  of  a*14.  It 
appears  here  that  economic  policy  aims  cannot  be  determined  on 
purely  normative  grounds.  The  rule  (12)  fails  because  it  is  not 
relevant  for  entrepreneurs.  They  do  not  take,  in  this  model,  the 
P/p1  ratio  into  consideration.  This  simple  case  is  an  illustration 
of  the  difficulties  of  shaping  a  "structuraltt  economic  policy. 
Furthermore  system  (S2)  is  stable  or  unstable  depending  on  the 
value  of  the  parameters.  All  things  being  equal,  the  stronger  the 
action  of  implementing  a  *  (that  means  k4 high)  the  greater  the  risk 
of  instability15.  It  is  the  same  for  the  intensity  of  the 
entrepreneurs'  reaction  to  variations  in  the  rate  of  interest. 
This  second  example  shows  how  irrelevant  it  may  be  to  study 
economic  policy  with  comparative  statics  only. 20 
APPENDIX 
On  some  microeconomic  foundations  of  the  model 
Assumptions  made  in  the  text  are  rather  crude.  The 
pedagogical  purpose  cannot  account  for  all  the  oversimplifications 
of  the  model.  One  assumption  is  crucial  which  states  that 
entrepreneurs  fix  their  price  according  to  a  predetermined  mark-up 
pricing  rule.  As  nominal  wage  and  technology  are  supposed  to  be 
constant,  this  assumption  amounts  to  that  of  exogeneous  fixed 
price.  . 
Kalecki's  degree  of  monopoly  theory  is  not  very  satisfactory 
since,  according  to  its  author,  it  seems  independent  of  any 
maximizing  behavior  of  the  entrepreneur.  "In  view  of  the 
uncertainties  faced  in  the  process  of  price  fixing  it  will  not  be 
assumed  that  the  firm  attempts  to  maximize  its  profits  in  any 
precise  sort  of  mannert116. 
However,  it  is  well  known  that  it  is  possible  to  make  the 
determination  of  the  mark  up  the  outcome  of  the  maximization  of 
profits. 
Let  us  consider  the  entrepreneur  i.  He  has  to  decide  the 
price  pi and  the  current  level  of  the  activity  wNi.  His  constraints 
are  the  technique  of  production,given  by: 
(a)  qi  =  xiNi 
and  the  proceeds  he  expects  to  get  from  his  decisions.  It  seems 
sensible  to  assume  that  the  share  yei of  the  anticipated  market  Rei 
the  entrepreneur  expects  to  get  depends  on  the  price  pi as  compared 
with  the  average  price  pei he  thinks  the  market  will  exhibit.  The 
higher  the  ratio  pi/pei  the  smaller  his  market  share.  Note  that 
pei may  differ  from  one  entrepreneur  to  another.  For  the  sake  of 
simplicity  we  shall  retain  a  linear  negative  relationship  between 
yei and  the  ratio  (pi/pei): 
(b)  Yei=  ui  -  '(Pi/P",)  with  0  <  z  -C ui  <  1 
The  expected  profits  of  entrepreneur  i  are  then: 
(c)  Pei =  [Ui  -  z (Pi/P'i) lRei-(qi/xi)w 21 
Since  qi=(Rei/pi)yei,  (c)  may  be  written: 
(d)  Pei =  [ui  -  z (Pi/P'i)  IReiLl-  (W/XiPi)  1 
The  price  pi which  corresponds  to  the  maximization  of  expected 
profits  is  given  by  making  the  partial  derivative  (u~w/x~P~~)  - 
(z/pei)  equal  to  zero  -  the  second  order  derivative  is  negative. 
We  get: 
(e)  Pan  =  (~~/z)~~(w/x~)~~(p~~)~~ 
The  expression  (e)  conforms  to  Kalecki's  result  except  for  the 
linearity.  The  price  is  a  function  of  the  cost  of  production 
(w/xi)  and  of  the  expected  average  price  of  the  sector(pei): 
If  entrepreneurs  expect  the  average  price  to  be  related  to 
average  cost  by  a  mark-up  reflecting  average  conditions  of 
production  and  market,  say: 
(f)  Pei =  (u/z) (w/x) 
where  u  and  x  are  the  corresponding  macroeconomic  counterparts  of 
ui  and  xi  (for  the  sake  of  simplicity  u  and  x  are  supposed  to  be 
known  by  entrepreneurs),  the  equation  (e) becomes: 
(9)  P*i =  (h/j) (Ui/Z)  (W/Xi) 
where  h  and  j  indicate  the  relative  position  of  entrepreneur  i  as 
compared  with  the  economy  as  a  whole  [ u  =h2  ui  and  x  =  j2  xi). 
In  the  case  of  the  representative  entrepreneur,  the  price  is 
given  by 
(h)  P*  =  (u/z) (w/x) 
with  (u/z)=m  (see  text). 
From  Pan  it  is  possible  to  deduce  q*i  and  Ni: 
(i)  q*i  =yeiRei/p*i  =  (  ji  ZXi/hiUiW)  [(hiUi- 
Zij)/hi  IRei 
0)  wN*~  =  wq*Jxi  =  (jiz/hiui)  [(hiui-zji)/hi]Rei 
Consequently,  we  have  all  the  elements  necessary  to  determine 
from  individual  entrepreneurs'  decisions  not  only  the  aggregate 
level  of  the  activity  wN  but  the  feed  back  effects  upon  the 
rentability  and  the  solvency  of  entrepreneurs  (if  we  add  an 
assumption  on  the  distribution  of  the  bonds  subscription  between 
entrepreneurs). 22 
FOOTNOTES 
1.  In  orthodox  theory  this  link  (store  of  value)  is  the  unique 
attribute  of  money  which  allows  the  price  of  money  to  be  positive 
at  equilibrium  (see  the  overlapping  generations  models).  Far  from 
being  a specific  feature  of  Keynes  I  thought  (or  its  main  interest), 
the  weight  attached  to  this  alleged  function  of  money  constitutes 
the  main  common  point  with  orthodoxy!  Moreover  it  prevents  the 
investigation  of  other  directions. 
2.  The  consumption  credit  ought  not  to  be  confused  with  credit. 
Briefly:  consumption  credit  is  reimbursed  through  future  wages 
(intertemporal  allocation  of  income)  whereas  production  credit  is 
repaid  with  sales. 
3.  C.  Benetti  and  J.  Cartelier  (Marchands,  salariat  et 
capitalistes  Paris  1980  Maspero)  characterize  the  wage 
relationship  as  monetary  submission.  Generally  it  has  been  argued 
that  the  payment  of  the  wage  does  not  imply  the  delivery  of  a 
determinate  quantity  of  labor.  The  execution  of  the  ttcontractVV 
requires  thus  particular  procedures  more  or  less  related  to 
production.  This  has  been  extensively  studied  by  orthodox 
(Stiglitz)  or  heterodox  authors  (S.Bowles,R.Boyer  etc.). 
4.  Incidentally,  it  is  worth  recalling  that  this  is  a  very 
important  difference  from  classical  economics  where  the  asymmetry 
between  entrepreneurs  and  workers  is  expressed  by  making  the  real 
wage  part  of  the  means  of  production. 
5.  See  C.  Benetti  and  J.  Cartelier  "Monnaie  et  formation  des 
grandeurs  economiques"  in  La  formation  des  srandeurs  economioues 
Encyclopedic  Diderot  PUF  Paris  forthcoming  1989 
6.  The  term  renroduction  might  be  more  appropriate  with  the 
obvious  advantage  that  it  refers  to  a  respectable  tradition.  But 
Classical  economists  and  modern  Neoricardians  seem  to  have  not  had 
much  to  say  about  the  executability  of  transactions  out  of 
equilibrium.  Their  neglect  for  money  is  obviously  at  the  heart  of 
this  gap. 23 
7.  One  may  find  it  useless  to  speak  of  an  equipment  goods  sector 
in  a  one-good  economy.  This  is,  however,  correct  if  it  is 
recalled  that  investment  is  not  defined  by  the  use  value  of  the 
goods  but  only  by  the  nature  of  the  agents  doing  the  transaction. 
As  Keynes  put  it:  'IThe  criterion  [between  consumption  and 
investment]  must  obviously  correspond  to  where  we  draw  the  line 
between  the  consumer  and  the  entrepreneur"(GT  p.62) 
8.  It  is  assumed  that  the  economy  is  described  ab  ovo  without  any 
accumulated  financial  assets.  This  hypothesis  is  obviously 
inessential  and,  in  any  case,  the  reasoning  could  be  adapted  to 
more  realistic  assumptions. 
9.  A  different  assumption  could  be  made  to  take  into 
consideration  an  idea  advocated  by  H.  Minsky:  entrepreneurs'are  not 
very  aware  of  their  financial  position  until  it  reaches  a  critical 
level,  say  B*.  Equation  (9)  would  be: 
(9a)  dR/dt  =  k,(P-Pe)  -  k,(B  -  B*) 
Under  this  assumption,  the  equilibrium  locus  would  be: 
(lla)  wN*  =  [k,(pI+pG)+kz(gr+B*)]/[k,(m-b)+k2f] 
The  locus  would  not  even  contain  E! 
10.  It  must  be  recalled  that  in  this  model  r,  as  an  exogeneous 
variable,  replaces  the  money  supply  of  the  ISLM  model.  It  does  not 
sound  unreasonable  to  say  that  r  is  fixed  conventionally  (see 
General  Theory  chapter  15).  In  the  ISLM  framework  r  is 
endogeneously  determined;  in  the  model  presented  it  is  the  degree 
of  solvency  of  entrepreneurs  which  is  endogeneously  determined. 
This  (sole)  departure  from  ISLE  theory  is  the  straight  consequence 
of  having  assumed  a  monetary  coordination  of  the  actions  of 
entrepreneurs. 
11.  It  would  be  very  easy  to  take  into  account  the  interest  paid 
by  the  entrepreneurs;  it  would  be  part  of  the  factor  costs.  The 
banks  would  spend  these  receipts  either  in  investment  or  in  wages. 
12.  Determinant  of  the  matrix  of  the  homogeneous  system  is 
positive  [k,k,ef/m  >  0]  and  the  trace  is  negative  (-(l/m)[k,(m- 
b)+k,f). 
13.  The  same  is  true  for  the  Classics  and  for  Marx. 
14.  It  would  be  the  case  only  if  a*=  [g(m-l)(LT+pG)]/[g(m-b)LT- 
efpG]. 
15.  The  trace  of  the  coefficients  matrix  of  the  homogeneous  system 
is  positive  or  negative  according  to  whether  mek4  is  greater  or 
less  than  k,(m-b)+kzf.  The  determinant  is  positive  (negative)  if 
(1-b)/(l-a*)  is  greater  (less)  than  k,(m-b)+k,f. 24 
16.  M.Kalecki  8'Costs  and  prices"  in  Selected  essays  on  the 
dvnamics  of the  capitalist  economy  Cambridge  University  Press  1971 
(P-44) 